A skill is instruction content, not an executable process. Copying a SKILL.md
does not itself run the commands it contains. The security boundary changes when
an agent loads those instructions and receives permission to use a shell,
network, credentials, filesystem, browser, MCP server, or other tool.
Treat every community skill and every bundled file as untrusted input until you have reviewed the exact installed revision. A risk label describes intended capability; it is not a malware verdict or safety certificate. Repository stars, contributors, Markdown-only packaging, and a commit pin are not substitutes for review.
Use an exact selection and inspect it without execution:
npx agentic-awesome-skills audit --skills <skill-id,skill-id>
npx agentic-awesome-skills --skills <skill-id,skill-id> --dry-run
The audit recursively reads the selected skill directories and reports command, network, credential, filesystem, privileged, destructive, symlink, and binary signals. Read the files behind every finding and ask your agent to explain them. Static pattern matching can miss dangerous logic and can flag legitimate security examples, so a clean report does not prove safety.
For external sources, require a full commit pin or immutable release, download to a temporary review directory, inspect package scripts and every bundled file, and approve the final copy separately. Do not pipe remote content into a shell or clone a moving branch directly into an active agent directory.
Security documentation often contains exploit names, commands, or payload fragments that signature scanners recognize. A detection in Markdown can be a correct content detection without showing that a Trojan executed. Do not dismiss it, but distinguish content from activity:
SECURITY.md. Include evidence of execution or impact
separately from the flagged text.